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HINIHUH WAGE RATES AND THE PURE THEORY OF IHTERNATIONAL TRADE* 
Richard A. Brecher 
IHTRODUCTION 
Nost of the pure theory of international trade deals with full­
employment economies. Ily relaxing the usual assumption that the real 
wage is perfectly flexible, it is possible to focus upon a situation of 
unemployment. The present paper extends the standard Heckscher-Ohlin type 
analysis of an open economy to the case where the real wage of labour is 
subject to an exogenously specified floor or minimum. This floor-­
institutionally determined at the same level in all sectors of the economy-­
constrains the actual wage to exceed the wage required for full employment, 
so that the labour force is partially unemployed. Once market .forces have 
bid the wage down to the mininum level, any of the given labour endowment 
not yet utilized forms a pool of unemployed uho are willinr.; to work at the 
going (minimum) wage but are unable to get hired. Producers in the minimum­
wage economy hire no more labour from the pool of unemployed than is needed 
to satisfy demand and supply in world commodity markets. Bhagwati ([2], 
* This paper is a revision (with some extensions) of material from 
Chapters I, II, IV, and VIII (excluding its mathematical appendix) of my Ph.D. 
thesis (6]. 
For their guidance and encouragement of this work, I am deeply indebted 
and grateful to Richard E. Caves, chairman of my dissertation committee, and to 
Jagdish iJ. Bhagwati and Thomas O. Horst, members of this committee. I also wish 
to thank Michael B. Connolly, Richard a. Cooper, John C.H. Fei, Jonathan Goldberg,
James L. HcCabe and Daniel iI. Schydlowsky for comments on all or parts of the 
material at various stages of its preparation. Of course, I alone am 
responsible for any remaining errors or shortcomings. 
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pages 17-22) has described this type of factor-market imperfection as 
the case where the actual wage is constrained to be above the optimal 
or shadow wage. This situation must be distinguished, as pointed out 
by Bhagi1ati~ from two other cases--the case of a distortive wage 
differential (e.g., Rhagwati and Ramaswami [SJ), and the case in which 
the wap,e diverges from the marginal product of labour in an activity 
(e.g., Fei and Ranis [7] and Lewis [14]). 
Once the general equilibrium model is set up~ it is possible to 
examine its comparative static properties for various parametric shifts. 
It is well known that a parametric shift will create (before full adjustment 
occurs) excess demands and supplies in world commodity markets, and 
corresponding excess demands and supplies in domestic factor markets (as 
labour and capital are reallocated between sectors of unequal factor 
proportions). Any excess demand for or supply of labour, that would drive 
the real wage up or down in the standard full-employment model, will instead 
raise or lower the level of home employment in the present minimum-wage 
model, respectively. Employment, not the wage rate, now bears the burden 
of adjusting to the international equilibrium. Domestic social welfare 
(in the Pareto sense) is another variable, like domestic employment, whose 
comparative static response receives special attention below. 
It may be helpful to relate the present treatment of real factor­
price rigidity to three earlier discussions, by. Bhaewati ([2), the third 
of three cases that he analyzes on pages 17-22). Haberler [8], and Johnson 
[9]. Neither Haberler nor Johnson specifies the wage floor exogenously; 
instead, they both take the initial level of employment and corresponding 
wage as given, treating this wage as the minimum. In the present 
discussion, however, the minimum is exogenously given and affects 
the initial level of employment. Bhagwati exogenously fixes the actual 
wage, rather than the minimum, ruling out both upward and downward flexibility. 
In the present discussion, on the other hand, upward flexibility is not 
impossible (since full employment, instead of the minimum uage, could be 
the binding constraint under certain conditions); although, in the most 
interesting case, the home economy always operates with unemployed labour 
whose presence prevents the equilibrium wage from rising above the floor. 
With Haberler and with Johnson, rigidity applies in some cases to factor 
prices in general; whereas, with Bhagwati and in the present analysis, 
only one factor price at a time is ever less than perfectly flexible. 
(Although only the case of a minimum real wage is considered explicitly 
below, the analysis would be similar in the event of a floor to the real 
return on capital instead of the wage.) Bhagwati, Haberler~ and Johnson 
all take world prices as given, whereas the present treatment also con-
siders the case in which the home country has monopoly power in trade. 
The two major concerns of this previous literature on factor-price rigidity 
are: to compare free trade with autarchy, by considering the employment 
and welfare effects of imposing or abolishing a prohibitive tariff; and, 
to determine optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) commercial policy. The 
first of these two issues is re-examined, more extensively and more generally, 
in (Part II, Section B=of) the present paper which also examines the impact 
of non-prohibitive tariffs (Part IV). A more detailed examination of the 
second of these two issues is one subject of a future study (and may 
also be found in Brecher [6], Chapter IX), althoueh a few comments on 
-4-
optimal trade intervention are offered below {Part IV). A brief 
summary of other aspects of the present paper is contained in the following 
overall outline. 
Part I sets up the basicThe material is divided into four parts. 
model of a minimum-wage economy, by deriving the following three equilibrium 
relationships: the transformation curve, shown to be composed of linear 
segments; the consumption curve, or locus of aggregate consumption bundles; 
and the offer curve, shown to have a linear segment. Part II introduces 
a conventional foreign offer curve to determine equilibrium in all markets 
including the home labour market , and then shows that: 1) a minimum 
wage in just one country roay be sufficient to restrict the l-1age in both 
countries to the home floor; 2) a move from autarchy to free trade may 
decrease home employment and home welfare--not the case in the absence 
of a minimum wage; and 3} imposing a minimum-wage constraint in a free­
trade situation may improve home welfare (despite a fall in employment), 
and may reverse the direction of trade {in which case welfare decreases). 
Some comparar.ive static properties of the model are explored in the 
final two parts. A number of the results derived there would not be 
reached in the absence of a minimum wage. Part III shows that a shift in 
foreign demand in fa•,our of home exports may reduce home employment and 
home welfare. In Part IV, which analyzes changes in home tariffs, the 
1) when a tariff is raised,more general conclusions include the following: 
home employment m..::ly decrease, although an incr~a.se {decrease) in home 
welfare may accompany a decrease (incres:i.se) in emp!oyment; 2} when the 
home country has monopoly power in ':',::,?ilia, optimal trade intervention (in the 
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absence of complementary policy) is not necessarily a tariff, but instead 
may be a trade subsidy or simply free trade; and 3) lihen it has no 
monopoly power in trade, the home country may be worse off with free trade 
than with a tariff or a trade subsidy. The method of comparative statics 
used here may be adapted readily for analysis of other parametric shifts 
1not considered explicitly below, as sho~m by Brecher [6]. 
I. DOMESTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
This part discusses the equilibrium relationships in the minimum-wage 
(home) economy, treatin8 production in Section A, consumption in Section B, 
and the offer in Section C. Determination of the actual equilibrium is 
left for the followinp: part uhere the model is completed by introducing 
foreign demand. 
A. Production 
The transfoniation curve, showing the equilibrium quantities produced 
at each commodity-price ratio 1 is derived in this section. Also illustrated 
here is the equilibrium relationship between the product-price ratio and 
the level of overall labour employment. Since the transformation curve 
turns out to depend on market relationships and entrepreneurial behaviour, 
in addition to technology and the levels of total factor employment, it 
is not a conventional production-possibility frontier (which depends only 
on technology and total employment levels). The terms "transformation 
curve" and 11 production-possibility frontier" will always be used in these 
different ways to distinguish the market equilibrium schedule from the purely 
-6-
technical schedule, respectively. 
Consider the faoiliar case of a simple econony in Hhich two 
.•commodities, one and two, are produced with two homogeneous primary 
factors of production, labour and capital. For each ~ood, the level of 
technology is given and production exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Producers maximize profits in both in<lustries (and, Hhen deP1and is 
introduced in Section n below, consumers maxinize utility), in an environ­
ment that is entirely free fro~ externalities. Fxcept for the wage floor 
(to be specified), perfect competition prevails. It is assumed throughout 
that good two is more labour-intensive (i.e., uses a larger labour/capital 
laratio) than good one at every co':Dmon factor-price ratio. Labour and 
capital are perfectly mobile domestically (though completely immobile 
internationally), so that each factor's reward is the sane in both 
sectors. The real Hage of labour may be denoted by 
T•T C::/p W
"1 2 
where wi (i = 1, 2) is the real wage in terms of commodity i, and equals 
the marginal product of labour in industry i because of profit maximization~ 
and p is the relative price of the second good in terms of the first, 
At this point, it is important to decide hou to define the r:ti.nimum 
wage. Consider the following tb:ree separate possibilities, where in each 
2 case some institutiona1 arrangement (such as custom, law, or labour 
3unions) sets and enforces the miniT!mm real wage at the same level in 
bcth4 sectors of the economy. If the minimu□ wage is specified in terms 
of the second rood, at some particular level denoted by w2, then the 






2 • • • (1) 
Instead, the minimum could be fixed in terms of the first commodity, at 
some specific level denoted by w
1 
, in which case the minimum-wage 
constraint would be 
Finally, the minimum uage could be d~fined alternatively in terms of a 
constant-utility combination of both goods. Only the first case, as 
expressed by constraint (1), is treated ex?licitly in the present paper. 
The analysis, however, could easily be extended to the other two cases 
(as shovm by Brec:1er [6], Chapter I), and these two cases are summarized 
briefly t,,ithout proof in footnote 19 belm:-1. 
The total employment levels of labour and capital are constrained to 
be less than or equal to fixed factor endow!'lents, with no possibility 
of international factor ~obility. The supply of capital is assumed to 
be perfectly inelastic at the given endornnent, so that the total capital 
stock is always fully utilized. In the absence of wage rigidity 9 the 
supply of labour (by assumption) also uould be perfectly inelastic at 
the given endowment. Given the institutionally-imposed wage floor, 
however, the effective supply of labour--althoueh still perfectly inelastic 
(at the given endowment) for any above-miniI!luI!l uage--is now perfectly 
elastic at the I!linimum wage (with a maximum supply set by the ~iven 
endowment)•· 5 Therefore, there is no assurance that the total labour force 
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p
will be fully employed. 6 Since labour but not capital can be unemployed, 
any mention of variations in total employment will always refer only to 
labour unless otherwise stated. 7 
In FiP,ure 1, T2T1 is the full-employment (conventional) production­
possibility frontier, drawn for the given endowments of labour and 
capital. Because labour may be partially unemployed 7 production may take 
place at points below T2T1 • It is assumed, initially, that the minimum 
wage (in terms of good two) is fixed at the level defined by the marginal 
product of labour (in industry two) at point R2on T2T1 • In this case, 
the transformation curve turns out to be T2R2RiT1 , and now is derived by 
considering output (and employment) equilibrium at each individual product­
price ratio. 
Let p0 be the first product-price ratio quoted to producers. Given 
0
, maximum profits could be made by producing at R2 (where the budget 
line for p 0 is tangent to T2T1) and paying labour its marginal product 
at R2which (as will be recalled) equals the minimum wage. Therefore, 
R2is a possible output equilibrium, since (given p 0 ) this point satisfies 
the (tangency) condition of profit maximization without violating the -, 
minimum-·wage constraint. As will now be shor,m, R2 is only one of many 
possible output equilibria corresponding to p 0 (This indeterminacy• 
in production will be eliminated, in general, later in the discussion 
when demand for commodities is eventually introduced.) 
To find another possible output equilibrium for p 0 , consider a 
decrease in total employment of labour (with total utilization of capital 
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possibility frontier inwards to R2Y1 • Uith the price ratio constant at 
p 0 , profits could be maintained at the maximum level (always zero under 
constant returns to scale) by shifting production from point R2to point A 
0(where the budget line for p is tangent to R Y ). This shift from R22 1 
to A, at constant price ratio p 0 , would leave the profit-maximizing wage 
unchanged at the minimun level--by application of the well-knovm Samuelson 
[18} price relationship between the product-price ratio and (relative and 
absolute) factor rewards. 8 Since profits could be maximized at A by paying 
labour the min.imum wage~ and since unemployed labourers could not try to 
regain their lost jobs by bidding the ~-:rage below the floor (as they would 
if the wage were perfectly flexible), there would be no pressures at A 
drtv1ng the economy away from this point. Therefore 9 A is another possible 
output equilibrium for p 0 • 
By similar reasoning 1 production equilibrium (given p0 ) can occur 
(with a wage equal to the minimum) anywhere on the line R2R1--each of whose 
points (like R2, A, or R1) is the point of tangency between a budget line 
for p 0 and a production-possibility frontier (T2T1 for R21 R2Y1 for A, or 
Y2Rj_ for Ri), with each of these frontiers drawn for a different level of 
total labour employment (but always for the given stock of fully-employed 
capital). The line R2Ri~ known in trade theory as the Rybczynski line 
for price ratio p 0 , must be both negatively-sloped and (given that commodity 
0two is relatively labour-intensive) steeper than the budget line for p 
o
by application of the Rybczynski Theorem [17].' Since the real wage is 
constant (at the minimum level) along R2R1~the labour/capital ratio in 
each industry must be constant along R2Ri (by the assumption of constant 
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returns to scale)--thereby implying that this line is straight. 10 The 
level of total labour employment, and hence the aggregate labour/capital 
ratio (given full employment of capital), clearly decrease along R2Ri 
as industry two contracts: for at the constant factor proportions in e.ach 
sector, a shift of resources from the second industry to the first frees 
more labour from the labour·•intensive former than can be abosrbed by 
the capital-intensive latter; and the excess labour, unable to bid the 
wage below the minimum, flows into the pool of unemployed. 
Now suppose that the quoted price ratio falls to any level below 
p0 (say to level p11 ). Since the budget line for the new price ratio {p11 ) 
is steeper than the production-possibility frontier through each point on 
R2Ri, ccn;tr.odity two is now unprofitable relative to commodity one at any 
initial point (say A) on R2Ri· Therefore (starting at A)~ resources begin 
shifting out of the second industry and into the first. To re-establish 
profitabllity of industry two, and hence profitability of incomplete 
specialization (at any pt:iiut on the undrawn Rybczynski line for p")~ the wage 
(p
would have to decline in terms of both r,oods to some sub-minimum level--
by application of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [19] 11--given that the 
relative price of the labour-intensive good has declined below the level 
0
) associated (under incomplete specialization) with the minimum wage. 
Because the wage floor prevents this decline in the real wage, the second 
industry and incomplete specialization r.er:1ain unprofitable. Therefore, 
flows of resources must lead to complete specialization in commodity one. 12 
Output equilibrium (for p11 ) occurs at a unique point (like B), which may be 
located by imagining the following two-step path of adjustment. First, it 
-11-
is possible to think of the economy as moving (from the initial equilibrium 
A) down R2Ri, through decreasing levels of employment, eventually achieving 
complete specialization at. hi· Recall that the wage at n.1 just satisfied 
the minimum-wage constraint when the price ratio was p 0 Thus, since the• 
0price ratio has now fallen beloH p (top"), unemployed labour at Ri_ could 
bid the wage (and marginal product of labour) down proportionately in terms 
of the first good without violating the minimum-wage constraint (1) in 
terms of the second good. Dy this process of bidding, employment and output 
increase above the R1 levels (recalling that the given capital stock is 
always fully utilized). This second step of adjustment takes the economy 
rightwards along R1T1 , past Ri_, to the new equilibrium point (Bin the case 
13of p"). As clearly implied by this reasoning, the further the pri_ce 
ratio falls below p 0 , the greater are the equilibrium levels of employment 
and output along RiT • Sufficiently small values of pare capable of1 
achieving full employment at T •1 
Finally, let the quoted price ratio rise to any level above p0 (say 
to level p00 ). By reversing the reasoning of the previous paragraph, given 
any initial poin·t (say A) on R2Ri, resources begin moving out of the first 
industry and into the second. Profits could be maintained at the maximum 
level by shifting production to the point {C) where the budget line for 
the new p (p00 ) is tangent to T R2. Since the relative price of the labour­2 
intensive good has risen (from p 0 to p00 ), the profit-maximizing wage 
increases (in terms of both goods) from the minimum level (at A) to some 
above-minimum level(~t C)--by application of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
00[19]. Therefore (given p ), output equilibrium can occur on T R2at the2 
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tangency point (C) in question·, where maximization of profits does not 
violate the minimum-wage constraint. Furthermore, it is not possible 
(given p 00 and its corresponding above-minimum wage) to find another output 
equilibrium (additional to C) by reducing the level of employment, since 
unemployed labour would not cease trying to bid the (above-minimum) wage 
14
down to the floor. It is possible to imagine the economy adjusting to 
equilibrium by first moving (from the initial equilibrium point A) up 
R2Ri through increasing levels of employment, and then leftwards along 
T2R2(to the new equilibrium point C) through increasing levels of the 
real wage. 
In summary, the entire transformation curve is T R2R1T1 , given the2 
initially chosen minimum wage (defined by the marginal product of labour 
at R2). In the present context uhere the main focus is on unemployment, the 
segment T R2is not especially interesting, since alonz T R2the economy2 2 
operates in the well-known full-employment manner ·with the minimum wage 
not great enough to be a binding constraint. To concentrate on the less­
known cases of unenployment, it is desirable to remove T R2from the2 
transformation curve by respecifying the minimum wage at a sufficiently 
higher level. As the minimum wage is raised, its corresponding p under in­
complete specialization increases above p0 (by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
[19]), and therefore the associated Rybczynski line shifts leftwards. Suppose 
that the new increased minimum wage corresponds top' and hence to the 
15
Rybczynski line for p', R2R1 




.) By previous reasoning, in Figure 2 (which reproduces the 
essentials of Figure 1) production equilibrium is noH on R2
R
1 


































for all p < p' (with employment and output increasing asp 
decreases). For each p > p' (say p"'), equilibrium can no longer be 
achieved at any profit-maximizing point of incomplete specialization 
(on the undrawn Rybczynski line for p"'), because each such point would 
involve both an above-minimum wage (by application of the Stolper­
Samuelson Theorem [19]) and unemployed labour attempting to bid this wage 




and hence entirely belm, T2
T1
). Thus, for all p > p', resources 
shift out of the first industry and into the second (by previous reasoning) 
until the economy is completely specialized in commodity two at R2 , w
here 
the condition of profit maximization is met (in the form of a corner solution 
with the budget line for pm flatter than ::>.2
Y
1
), and nhere labour's 
marginal product in industry two equals the minimum wage (as at all points 
on R2
R1
). Since labour's equilibrium wage (and marginal product) cannot 
fall in terms of good two, production cannot move prises further 
above p' . The en tire new transformation curve is 
Raising the minimum uage has not only ruled out incomplete specialization 
at full employment, but has also admitted the interesting possibility of 
17







except at point T1 
, there is some unemployment at 
all points except T1 
, so that the minimum-wage constraint (1) is necessarily 
binding at all points except T1 
. 
18 To concentrate on cases of unemployment, 
it is assumed throughout the remainder of the discussion, unless stated 







only transformation curve considered throughout the rest of the analysis. 
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B. Consumption 
Consider Figure 3, which reproduces the transformation curve rr R T
2 1 1 
from Figure 2. For each p (say p') and corresponding point (for example, D) 
on the transformation curve, there is a social budget line (drawn through D 
with slope -1/p') along which consumption is assumed to occur at the point 
(d) where a conventional community indifference curve is tangent to the 
budget line. The locus of all such consumption points is ir r e, and will
2 1 
be called the consumption curve. The sevnents ir2 , r 2r and r e correspond1 1 
respectively to the three segments of the transformation curve R2, R R2 1 
and R Tl" Assuming that r is continuous, it must clearly intersect2r1 1 
R R at least once (although perhaps only at an endpoint), as at point a.2 1 
It is assumed throughout, unless stated otherwise, that neither good is 
20
inferior. Therefore; r must have a positive slope throughout and2r 1 
hence must cut R2I\ only once. 
21 
The segments r 2i and r 1
e are drawn to 
reflect the fact that, when there is complete specialization in production, 
a rise in the relative price of the commodity produced must increase the 
consumption of the other good (given that the latter is not inferior). 
C. The Offer 
For each p (say p') and corresponding production-cum-consumpti.on 
combination (e.g., D-cum-d) in Figure 3, there is an offer of exports (Md) 
for an equal market value of imports (DM), with this offer represented in 
the familiar manner by an offer triangle (dMD). Placing all such triangles 
into Figure 4 (where triangle SJO represents the equal triangle dMD of 
Figure 3) gives rise, in the usual way, to the offer curve u A A u
1
. The
2 2 1 
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Commodity One (Capital-intensive) ,,.,,
1/ 




Commodity One (Capital-intensive) 
[Home Imports and Foreign Exports] 
Commodity Two (Labour-intensive) 
[Home Imports and Foreign Exports] 
Figure 4 




in Figure 4 corresponds to moving 
continuously up R2R1 and r 2r 1 in Fipure 3, at price ratio pv, through 
successively greater levels of employment and welfare. Hith continuous 
movements along A2u2 towards u2 (Figure 4), employment and output are 
constant at the R.
2 
levels (Figure 3), but the economy moves continuously 
up r 2i (Figure 3) through successively greater levels of welfare. Moving 
continuously along A1u1 towards u1 (Figure 4) corresponds to continuously 
rightward movements along R
1T1 and r 1e (Figure 3), through successively 
higher levels of employment and welfare. The segments A2u2 and A1u1 
{Figure 3) cannot bend back to the ori~in (i.e.~ home imports must not 








h2.ve been. drmm inelastic, none of 
the subsequent analysts would be upset if these segments were instead 
dra~m elastic. (Throughout this paper; unless otherwise stated~ the 
elasticity of an offer curve is taken to be the price-elasticity of imports; 
and as this elasticity is greater or less than one, the offer curve is 
said to be elastic or inelastic, respectively.) Since employment (and hence 
output) does not respond to product-price changes when specialization is 
complete in good two, the elasticity of A2u2 equals the elasticity of the 
conventional (constant-employment, all-prices-flexible) offer curve (drawn 
in the usual way for a conventional production-possibility frontier). But 
because employment (and hence output) does respond to commodity-price 





exceeds the elasticity of the conventional offer curve by the amount 
of the price-induced employment effect on imports. 
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II. IlITERNATIONAL P.QtTILIBRIUH 
The opportunity to trade internationally is represented by a 
conventional well-behaved foreign offer curve~ such as OF in Figure 4. 
World equilibrium occurs at the point--assumed to be unique--where the 
forei~n offer curve intersects the home offer curve. At this point, Sin 
Figure 4, domestic as vell as ·world markets are in equilibrium, and the 
level of home eMployment is uniquely determined. 
Stability of equilibrium in world commodity markets requiree, as usval, 
that the foreign price-elasticity of imports and the home price-elasticity 
of imports St.ll!l. to more than unity. This condition is clearly met when the 
home country is incompletely spec~~lized, since the home elasticity is then 
infinite. Hhen the home country is completely specialized~ the stability 
condition is assumed to hold. (In fact, the previously assumed uniqueness 
of world equilibrium guarantees stability.) In the home regions of 
incomplete specialization (A A1, excluding A2 and A ) and complete2 1 




) , l·1here the elasticity of the 
home offer curve exceeds the elasticity of the conventional (constant­
employment, all-prices-flexible) home offer curve (recalling the end of 
Section C, Part I), the stability condition can be satisfied tYith the 
present minimum-wage offer curve even l•1hen not satisfied with the conventional 
offer curve. 
A. Factor-Price Egualization 
A (binding) minimum-wage constraint has an interesting, though not 
surprisin~, implication for factor-price equalization. If both countries are 
·-17--
incompletely specializad under free trade (in which case equilibrium must 
occur on Al·i in Fie>,ure 4) , and if all other standard assumptions for 
factor-price equalization (see Samuelson [18]) are made, then the equilibrium 
wage in both countries equals the home ~inimum. That is, under these 
circumstances, a miniMum-wa~e constraint in just one country is sufficient 
to restrict the wage in both countries to the home floor. 
If• however, the foreign country were then to impose its o't>m (binding) 
minimum-wage constraint~ the offer curve of each of the tuo countries would 
have the Ricardian shape (like u A .1\u1), and. therefore at least one country2 2 
would be completely specialized--assuming that the two wage floors were not 
identical, so that the straip;ht-line se~ments of the two offer curves did 
not coincide. Thus, in this case, the uage uould not be equalized internation­
ally, but instead e2ch country's real wa~e uould be given by its Ol·m 
minimum. 
B. Free Trade versus Autarc~y 
Recalling (from Section C of :Part I) hm! employment and welfare vary 
along the home offer curve? it is a straightforward exercise to compare the 
free-trade levels of employment and uelfare l7ith the levels under autarchy. 
If free trade leads the home country to export good two, employment 
and uelfare both rise above the autarchy levels as the equilibrium offer 
moves up OA2u from Oto some point like Sin Figure 4. (Correspondingly~2 
in terms of Figure 3, the economy moves from point a, up aR in production
2 
to some point liken, and up ar i in consumption to the corresponding point d.)
2 
In the event that free trade leads the home country to export good one, 
what happens to employment and i:·relfare depends upon the de~ree of free-trade 
--18-· 
specialization in home production. If, in this case., home production 
re!:1ains incomnletely snecialized, then eT'lplorent and. , 7elfa.re decline belou 
the autarchy levels as the equilibriuM offer moves fror::. 11oint Oto some 
lower ?Oint on OA
1 
. (Correspondin<?,ly, in Fi~ure 3, tI1e economy moves from 
point a dovmwards alon?" aR and ar .) But if, instead, the home country
1 1 
ends up col"pletely soecialized r-1hile exporting: the first coimnodity, then 
employment and/or ~!elfare could (but need not) rise above the autarchy 
levels as the equilibriur:-, offer shifts from point O to so~euhere on 
A1u1 . (Correspondingly, in tern>s of Fif>:ure 3., the economy m.oves from 
point a to sor,ie production level on R T and s01:ie consu!"'-;1tion level on
1 1 
r e.) In this last case, Felfare can i,mrove even Phen employment decreases-­
1 
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provided the hoE1.e ter,1s of trade fr1prove sufficiently. 
C. Wa?;e--Constrained TI'ree Trade versus na;-r.e-1:;'lexible Free Trade 
A (T,inc.ino) mininur1-u-ap;e constraint, imnosecl. in an initia.l ua~e-flexible 
free-trade situation of full e~Ployment, will reduce the level of home 
employment helm-I the endm-~ent level----exceot in the special case, ruled out 
by assu!:1ption (on pai:r,e 13 above) 1 in which the resultinr: ~rage-constrained 
equilibrium involves connlete ST)ecialization at point T1 in Fi~ure 3. Home 
"Welfare, houever, may still increase provided the 1:lome terms of trade 
improve sufficiently, as sli.orrn by the follm-rinP- exanmle in Fir_:ure 5 (which 
reproduces T?Tl and :--. :", 'I' from F'is:mre 2). In the absence of the wage
2 1 1 
floor~ the equilibrium Horld orice ratio is p 00 , the home country produces 
at C, nnd hone consul!lption is at con indifference curve I-I. Imposing the wage 
constraint then raises the equilibrium world price ratio to p 1 (implying 




















country to produce at G and consume at g on higher indifference curve 
II-II. 
Restating this proposition in reverse, the removal of a (binding) 
minimum-wage constraint may reduce the home free-trade level of welfare 
when the home country has monopoly power in trade. This possibility 
of welfare loss through employment expansion, in the event of abolishing 
a wage floor, is analytically similar to the familiar case of 
immiserizing growth (discussed by Bhagwati [3]). Furthermore, this 
possibility of a deterioration in welfare, as a result of the abolition 
of a domestic distortion (due to the minimum-wage constraint) when there 
is a continuing foreign distortion (due to monopoly power in trade), 
illustrates the general proposition (see J3hagwati [4], Proposition 6, 
page 86) that reducing the 11degree;r of only one of several distortions 
will not necessarily increase welfare. 
Although the home country exports the second commodity in the foregoing 
example of Figure 5, it would not be difficult to construct other 
examples in which the imposition of a wage floor increases welfare when 
the home country exports the first good. These latter examples would 
imply, as could easily be sho~-m, complete (home) specialization in 
commodity one under wage-constrained free trade and (assuming no inferiority 
in consumption) an inelastic foreign offer curve. 
The imposition of a minimum-wage constraint may reverse the direction 
of trade when the home cou!ltry exports the second good under wage-flexible 
free trade, as shm-m by the follm-,ing example in Figure 5. Suppose now 
that the home country has no monopoly power in trade, so that the world 
price ratio remains constant at p00 (<p'). Before the wage floor is 
imposed (given p = p00 < p'), home production is at C, home consumption 
is at c, and commodity t~m is the home export. When the ~-,age constraint 
is imposed (given p = p 00 < p'), home production becomes specialized 
completely in the first good (by the reasoning of Part I for the case 
of all p < p') at point C', home consumption shifts to c', and the home 
country becomes an exporter of commodity one (implying a reversal in 
the direction of trade). It could easily be shown that a trade reversal 
(caused by imposing a wage floor) does not require the absence of 
monopoly power in trade, but always implies a decrease in uelfare. Further­
more, when the home country instead exports the first good under ~-,age­
flexible free trade, the imposition of a wage floor cannot reverse the 
direction of trade (given a well-behaved foreign offer curve), as could 
easily be verified. 
III. A SHIFT IN FOREIGN DEMAND 
An increase in foreign import demand may raise or lower the home 
levels of employment and uelfare, with the actual outcome depending upon
.;.
the degree of specialization in home production and upon the direction of 
trade. The present possibility of welfare deterioration contrasts with 
the necessary welfare improvement in the standard full-employment model. 
When the home country is incompletely specialized, an increase in 
foreign import demand will lower (raise) the home levels of employment 
and welfare if good tHo (one) is the hone importable, as uill now be 
shm-m. Suppose that the equilibrium is initially at S in Figure 4, and that 
the foreign offer curve then shifts out from OF (its initial position) to 
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OF 1 • At constant prices (p') and constant home employt!lent, this shift 
in forei?;n denand creates a ~Torl.:~ excess demand for the labour-intensive 
second commodity (represented by line seement SS 1). This excess demand 
is cleared, at constant prices (:0 1), as home producers increase their 
export offer (from S to S1 ) by expanding outnut of good two (upwards 
alonP, R2R1 in Figure 3) uithout loss of profit. As the hor<1e country 
moves from S to the ne~; equilibrium Sv (and moves correspondingly, in 
Fieure 3? up Rl.1 and r 2r 1), the home equilibrium levels of emnloyment, 
income and welfare all increase. On the other hand, when the home 
country e>~ports the capital-intensive first commodity :i an increased foreiP.n 
demand for imports creates a t-rorld excess supply of the labour-intensive 
second commodity (at constant prices and constant emploYl'lent), and leads to 
a home deterioration in both employment and TJelfare. 
If the home country is completely specialized, an increase in foreign 
demand for imports aluays imnroves ~,elfare, and leads to an increase (no 
change) in enployment when p-ood two (one) is the home irriportable, as will 
now be shm•m. Hith the home country completely specialized and exporting 
the first Colll!nodity, an increase in forei8n ir.,.port demand uill create, 
at constant prices and constant home enployment, a r-rorld excess demand for 
good one. This excess demand is cleared partly by a rise in the relative 
price of good one, and partly by an increase in the level of home employment 
and output (since now these quantities increase with 1/p), as the home 
country moves rizhtuard alonp, A.
1u1 to a higher level of employment and 
·uelfare. Similarly~ if the ho-me country exports good t~-10 under comJ?lete 
specialization, an increased forei'.';n der1and for imoorts raises welfare 
(because of the terms·-of-trade im11rovement), but leaves the level of 
employnent constant (since no~1 this quantity does not vary with p). 
It is interestine that a uorld excess denand for the capital-intensive 
first conmodity leads to a rise in employment under complete specialization 
in that good, but leads to a fall in employment under incoraplete 
specialization. In both cases, output of the capital-intensive commodity 
increases in response to the rise in demamd. This increased output must, 
under complete specialization, result from a rise in total employment of 
labour~ since there are no resources to be drrum from the (non-operating) 
labour-·intensive industry. Dut when both goods are being produced, the 
increase in production of the c~pital-intensive industry is the result of 
drawinr both labour and capital from the labour-intensive industry. Some 
of this labour released fron the labour-intensive industry must flou into 
the pool of unenploye~~ since the constant factor proportions (along ~2R1 
in Figure 3) are unequal bet~1een industries. 
IV" TARIFF CHPJJG2S 
This part discusses the comparative statics of changes in tariffs. 
First
9 Section A develops the necessary analytic background by examining 
the implications of tariff changes for the transformation curve, the 
consumption curve, and the offer curve. Then, Section B considers how 
changes in tariffs affect resource allocation, output levels, overall 
employment~ terms of trade? and social welfare. 
Since an ad valorem tariff on imports has the same effect as an equal 
ad valorem tariff on exports (according to Lerner 1 s Symmetry Theorem [131 
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·which may be invo~_,ed under the assumptions made below), the following 
analysis applies to both of these trade taxes. Also, it is unnecessary to 
give a separate analysis of trade subsidies (on either imports or exports), 
since these may be viewed sinply as negative tariffs. 
A. Production, Consumption, and the Offer 
Let the ad valorem tariff be denoted by t, where t > O. (For a trade 
subsidy, -1 < t < 0.) Then the relationship between the domestic relative 
price of good two, still denoted by p, and the world relative price of good 
two, now denoted by ,r (whose value is to be determined by demand and supply 
in world commodity markets), may be written generally as 
p = rr/(1 + t) 
when the home import is commodity one, or 
p = rr(l + t) 
when the home import is commodity two. 
Since domestic producers and consumers respond directly only to domestic 
prices, a tariff does not affect the equilibrium relationship between the 
domestic product-price ratio (p) and factor reuards. Thus, there is no change 
in the equilibrium relationship between p on the one hand and the levels of 
employment and output on the other. In other ,·10rds, the transformation curve 
is always (with or without a tariff) R R T in Figure 6 (which reproduces2 1 1 
R R
1T and r 2r from Fie;ure 3), with each point on R R T always corresponding2 1 1 2 1 1 
to a unique value of p (which is the same with or without a tariff) and a 
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The home country's budget line through each production point has a 
slope of -1/-rr that, given the tariff, diverges from -1/p i:-1hich was the 
slope before the tariff. Assuming that the tariff revenues are redistributed 
to consumers as lump-sum transfers (and, in the case of trade subsidies, 
that these subsidies are raised from consumers in lump-sum fashion), con­
sumption takes place along each budget line at the point where the 
indifference curve cuttine; that line has a slope of -1/p'. For example, 
consider home production at point D [R ] iu Figure 6: the corresponding1 
equilibrium domestic price ratio is p' whether or not there is a tariff, 
according to the previous discussion of the transformation curve; in free 
trade, the corresponding equilibrium world price ratio would also be -rr' = p', 
and consumption ~-1ould be at d [r1
]; but given a tariff of rate t, the 
corresponding equilibrium world price ratio is 1r" = p'(l + t) [7T 0 = p'/(1 + t)] 
. . dt • t]and consumption is at tr • Thus, when both goods are produced at home, 
for incomplete specialization in production). 
1 
consumption is always (nith or without a tariff or trade subsidy) restricted 
to lie on the Engel curve for p', namely ri (whose segr:ientr 2 r 2r 1 is the 
23 
free-trade consumption curve 
Consumption for the case of complete specialization in production could be 
illustrated similarly. 
In Figure 7 (which reproduces u A A u from Figure 4), the tariff­2 2 1 1 
. t t t t
inclusive offer curve is u2A2oA1U1--assuming that the same tariff is tmposed 
on imports (or exports) of both goods, no.. .matter what the direction of 
24
trade. At world price ratio -rr" = p'(l + t), the home offer can be at 
any point on OA~; which corresponds in Figure 6 to production along aR2 
and consumption along ar2, at domestic price ratio p'. Similarly, at world 
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Commodity Two (Labour-intensive)
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price ratio 1r 0 = p'(l + t), the home offer can be at any point on OA~; which 
corresponds in Fi~ure 6 to production along aR
1 
and consumption along ari, 
at domestic price ratio p'. The sevnent A~U~ lies belou A2u2 since, with 
specialization complete in good two, imposition of a tariff reduces the 
offer at every 'IT according to the following argument: production remains 
constant (at the R
2 
level in Figure 6); and it is well knovm in the full­
employment literature that, at constant output, a tariff reduces the offer 




since, with specialization 
complete in good one, imposition of a tariff reduces the offer at every 'IT 
according to the folloi:-1ing argument: as just sho,;-m, even at constant output 
the tariff would reduce the offer at every 1r; but in addition, because the 





in Figure 6), so that the offer declines still further 
(in the absence of inferior goods). (In the case of a trade subsidy, in 
Figure 7: OA~ would be steeper than OA
2 ; OA1 would be flatter than OA1 ;t t t tA
2U2 would lie above A2u2 ; and Alu1 would lie belm-, A1u1 ") 
B. Comparative Statics 
The folloi:-1ing preliminary comments indicate the nature of the pro­
positions to be discussed. The signs of the employment response and of the 
output response to a tariff depend upon the relative factor intensity of the 
home importable, upon the degree of specialization in home production (i.e., 
incomplete versus complete), and upon whether or not the particular situation 
satisfies the Metzler Condition (which is the well-knovm condition for the 
occurrence of the Metzler Paradox in the standard full-employment model). 25 
A tariff's effect on welfare does not necessarily have the same sign as the 
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tariff's effect on employment. l·1elfare may deteriorate unless the foreign 
26offer curve is inelastic, as in the standard full-employment case. When 
the home country has monopoly power in trade, optimal trade intervention 
(not a first-best solution in the absence o-f complementary policy) is not 
necessarily a tariff but may instead be a trade subsidy or simply free 
trade, in contrast to the standard full-employment case in which an optimal 
tariff is always the first-best commercial policy. When the home country 
has no monopoly pouer in trade, a tariff or a trade subsidy may be superior 
to the policy of free trade, even though this possibility would not occur 
in the standard full-employment model. All tariffs are assumed to be 
non-prohibitive unless otherwise stated, since the earlier comparison of 
free trade and autarcliy (Section B of Part II) takes care of the analysis of 
prohibitive tariffs. 
i. Incomplete Specialization 
It is assumed in this sub-section that the home country is always 
incompletely specialized, both before and after the tariff change. 
First consider the case in which the home importable is the capital­
intensive first commodity. In Fi3ure 7, with OF as the foreign offer curve, 
the imposition of a tariff shifts the world equilibrium from point S to 
point V. (Having free trade in the initial equilibrium position is 
diagramatically convenient, but is not required for any of the following 
discussion.) Although the tariff increase leaves the domestic price ratio 
constant at level p', it raises the world price ratio from level,,.,= p' 
to ,r" = p'(l + t), representing an improvement in the home country's terms 
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of trade. (Hhenever p ,fa TI, the expression "terms of trade" will refer 
always to world, not domestic, prices,) 
To determine the change in employment, first consider the world excess 
demands and supplies that the above tariff chan3e would create at constant 
employment and corresponding prices {p' and 'IT 11 ) • It is ,-Jell known in the 
standard full-employment literature that, when the Metzler Condition is 
not met, this tariff increase--at constant domestic prices (p'), but 
increased world prices ('IT")--will create a world excess demand for the home 
importable (good one). (It is this world excess demand for the home 
importable that, in the standard full-employment model, will raise the 
domestic relative price of the home importable, and hence increase output 
of that good but decrease the real wage--the outcomes associated with the 
absence of the Metzler Paradox.) This Horld excess demand for the home 
importable may be represented in Figure 7 by the line segment VN: where V 
is the forei3n offer at uorld prices 'IT"; and N (some point on OAt above V)2 
is the home offer at constant employment, constant domestic prices p', but 
increased world prices 'lf11 This excess demand is eliminated, at constant• 
prices, as the home country moves down OA2 
t 
from N to V, and correspondingly 
moves down R R in Figure 6. These downward movements are achieved, as will2 1 
be recalled, by an increase in output of the capital-intensive first 
commodity (which is the home importable) and a decrease in employment. Thus, 
when the Metzler Condition is not m~h· the protective effect of a tariff 
is normal (as in the full-employment case), in the sense that output of the 
home importable increases; and employment declines. By similar reasoning, 
when the Metzler Condition is met: the proteciive effect of a tariff is 
perverse (as in the full-employment case), in the sense that output of the 
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home importable decreases or remains constant; and employment increases or 
remains constant, respectively. 
By similar reasoning, the following two propositions hold when the labour­
intensive second commodity is the home importable. First, as the Metzler 
Condition is not met or is met, the tariff will have a normal or perverse 
protective effect (as in the full-employment case), and employment will 
increase or fail to increase (i.e., decrease or re~ain constant), respectively. 
Observe that the employment response, for both the normal case and the 
perverse case, is now opposite in sign to the response that occurred when 
good one was the importable. This difference arises because a normal (perverse) 
increase (decrease or constancy) in output of the home importable involves 
increased (decreased or constant) employment if this importable is labour­
intensive, but involves decreased (increased or constant) e8ployment if this 
importable is capital-intensive. Second, as before, raising a tariff improves 
the home terms of trade (now by raising 1/rr) and leaves the domestic price 
ratio constant (at p'). 
To examine welfare variations, first suppose that commodity one is the 
home importable. \•Jhen the foreign offer curve is inelastic, a tariff must 
always improve home welfare (even though employnent will decrease unless the 
Metzler Condition is met), as will now be shm,m. Assuming that the foreign 
offer curve (OF in Figure 7) is inelastic, the deterioration in the foreign 
country's equilibrium terms of trade (from 1/-rr' to 1/rr") must increase both 
foreign exports and (because trade is balanced) home imports. Therefore, the 
final equilibrium (V) must lie east of the initial equilibrium (S). However, 
at constant home welfare (say indifference level I-I in Figure 6) and 
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corresponding prices (p = p 1 and 'IT= 11' 11), home consumption would remain 
constant (at din Figure 6) while home production of importables would 
increase (from D to Dt in Figure 6), in which case the home imports would 
decrease to some point like M (Figure 7) that lies west of the initial 
equilibrium (Sin Figure 7). Thus, a tariff, at constant home welfare 
and corresponding prices, will create a world excess demand for labour-intensive 
commodity two, represented in Figure 7 by the line segment MV. Home welfare 
must then increase above the initial level as the home country eliminates 
this world excess demand at constant prices (by moving from M to Vin Figure 7. 
t tand by moving correspondingly in Figure 6 from D and d upwards along D R2 
and dri). 
When the foreign offer curve is instead elastic (1n which ~ase employment 
must decrease since the Metzler Condition cannot be met), the impact of a 
tariff on welfare is ambiguous, with a negative employr:ient effect to be 
weighed against a positive terms-of-trade effect. For example, if the elastic 
foreign offer curve is OF' (OF") in Figure 7, then at constant home welfare 
and corresponding prices, a tariff creates a world excess supply of commodity 
two (one), represented by MV' (MV"). In this example, by previous reason-
ing, home welfare decreases (increases) from its initial level as the home 
country eliminates this excess demand by moving from M to the equilibrium point 
V' (V"). If the foreign offer curve is elastic throughout the relevant range. 
it may be impc:tssible to find a tariff that raises welfare above the free-
trade level. In other words, in some cases, tariff-restric::ed trade may 
be unambiguously inferior to free trade. 
Next, suppose that the home country inports the second commodity (instead 
of the first}. By similar reasoning (i.e., by once again considering the 
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world excess de!'1ands and supplies created, at constant home welfare and 
corresponding prices, by raising a tariff), the follouing two propositions 
hold. First, welfare deterioration in the event of raising a tariff still 
requires an elastic foreisn offer curve, and therefore nm1 implies an 
increase in employment (since the Metzler Condition cannot be met when the 
foreign offer curve is elastic). This possibility of a decrease in welfare, 
despite an improvement in both home employment and the home terms of trade, 
is now illustrated in Figure 6. In the initial equilibrium: the home 
terms of trade are l/n° 0 (> 1/rr'), implying an initial tariff (since the 
initial terms of trade, l/rr00 , exceed the free--trade terms of trade, 1/rr'); 
home production is at E; and home consumption is ate, After the tariff 
increase: the home terms of trade are at an improved level, l/rr000 ; home 
production is at increased-employment level, H; and home consumption is 
at a reduced-welfare level, h. In this example, since the home budget 
line (at world prices) is steeper than the transformation curve (R R ),
2 1 
an increase in employment upward along the transformation curve has 
(ceteris paribus) a negative impact on welfare by decreasing the value of 
national income at any given set of world prices. As a second proposition, 
any tariff (trade subsidy) imposed under free trade must nou drive welfare 
above (below) the free-trade level. In other words, tariff-restricted trade 
is unambiguously superior to free trade (and to subsidy-expanded trade in 
the same direction as free trade). This proposition and the previous one 
together imply that a tariff increase may reduce welfare only if the initial 
equilibrium is tariff-restricted. 
On the basis of the foregoing results, a few comments are now offered 
on optimal trade intervention--assuming both the absence of complementary 
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commercial policy and the maintenance of incomplete specialization {ignoring 
the possibility that the home country might do even better by using trade 
policy to achieve complete specialization). In the first place, optimal 
trade intervention is not by itself a first-best policy, since the latter 
requires DRS = DRT • FRT (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami [S]) while the former 
leaves DRS< DRT: where DRS is the domestic rate of substitution {in con­
sumption), given by (minus) the slope of the community indifference curve 
(Figure 6), and equals the constant 1/p' in equilibrium as will be recalled; 
DRT is the domestic rate of transformation (in production), given by (minus) 
the constant slope of R R (Figure 6), and exceeds 1/p' {=DRS) as will be2 1 
recalled; and FRT is the foreign rate of transformation {through trade), 
given by the slope of the foreign offer curve (Figure 7). More 
specifically, optimal trade intervention occurs at the point on the foreign 
offer curve where DRS< DRT = FRT, as sho~m by Brecher ([6], Chapter IX where, 
by use of the well-knm,m Baldwin [1] technique, the optimal trade policy 
is derived and placed in a welfare ranking along with alternative policy 
packages). Since (as will be recalled) raising a tariff always improves 
home welfare when the foreign offer curve is inelastic, the latter must 
be elastic at the point of optimal trade·intervention. Uhen the home 
country imports the first commodity under free trade, optimal trade 
intervention could require a trade subsidy (or simply free trade) rather 
than a tariff, since (as will be recalled) tariff-restricted trade in 
some cases may be unambiguously inferior to free trade. (The case of an 
optimal trade subsidy and the case of an optimal tariff are both 
illustrated by Brecher [6], Chapter IX.) But when the home country imports 
·-32-· 
t~e second comi:n.o(lity under free trade, optinal trade intervention always 
requires a tariff (nerhans a :,roM.hitive one in cor:.birrn.tion Trith a trade 
subsidy to reverse the direction of trade:. as sho,:.m by :".recher [6] in Chapter 
IX)~ since (as uill be recalled) tariff-restricted trade is "llPays 
unambi~uously superior to free trade (and to subsidy-expanded trade in 
the same direction as free trade). 
If, by coincidence, the forei~n offer curve is perfectly elastic at 
price ratio 1r' = p', then a.ny home tariff is prohibitive, 27 since the 
tariff-inclusive offer curve (U~A~()A~U~ in Figure 7) Pill in this case 
. f . ,.fer curve on1y at t11e1 autarc:1y poi nt (•") . 28i ntersect tne oreio;n o:i:: • u 
Recallinp; the earlier coT":parison of free trade uith autarchy (Section B of 
Part II), a tariff will (1ecrease or increase e,,1ployri_ent and ,relfare as the 
home country imports o:ood one or p.-ooc! trro under free trade, respectively. 
This nossibil:l.ty of nelfare iJT>provement does not exist in the standard 
full-e;n.nloyr,.ent Radel, in which (as a ~·rell-·lmmm pronosition) the optimum 
tariff is zero ,•rhen the horn.e country has no monopoly nouer in trade. 
ii. CoT1.plete Soecialization 
'"'!hen the home country 11roduces only co"lmoc1ity tuo? both before and 
after the tariff increase, equilibriun in Fi~ure 7 occurs first on A u2 2 
and then on A~U~. Drawino: in the foreign offer curve (not shmm) r-muld 
indicate an i"'lprovement in the home tert"'.S of trade. E1111:,loyment and output, 
hm•rever, are constant at the 11 level (Fio:ure 6), accordin8 to the earlier2 
discussed relationshi11 betFeen the offer curve and t'he transformation curve. 
The welfare propositions of the standard full-enployment case clearly carry 
over to the present constant-employment case. 
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When the home country produces only good one, both before and after 




1 . Drawing in the foreign offer curve (not shown) would indicate 
an improvement in the home terms of trade. By earlier reasoning (i.e., by 
again considering the world excess demands and supplies created by a tariff 
increase, at constant employment and corresponding prices): uhen the 
Metzler Condition is not met, a tariff will raise the domestic relative 
price of the home inportable (as in the standard full-employment model), and 
reduce employment (since this variable nm-1 decreases when p rises); but when 
the Metzler Condition is met, a tariff will fail to raise (i.e., decrease 
or not change) the domestic relative price of the home importable (as in 
the standard full-employment model), and will fail to reduce employment. 
Observe that the si~n of the employment response nou differs from what it 
was under incomplete specialization with good two as the importable; i.e., 
under incomplete specialization, employment increased when the Metzler 
Condition was not met, and failed to increase otheruise. 
The following two welfare propositions, for the case of complete 
specialization in good one, follow from previous reasoning (i.e., from again 
considering the world excess demands and supplies created by a tariff 
increase, at constant welfare and corresponding prices). 29 First, a tariff 
increase improves welfare if the foreign offer curve is inelastic, 
even when employment falls. Second, if the foreign offer curve is elastic 
(in which case employment declines since the Metzler Condition cannot be 
met), a tariff increase may reduce welfare by decreasing employment 
sufficiently to outweigh the positive terms-of-trade effect. 
11hen ho!ne specialization is conplete in ?;oorl one and the foreign 
offer curve is ·.,erfectly elastic, a tariff increase uill raise p and 
therefore reduce e:rnploy:nent (since 1/p and eMr,loyment decrease top;ether), 




in Ii'iP-ure 6. In this case, a 
tariff will clearly reduce uelfare since there is no terms-of--trade 
i~prove:rnent to counter the fall in emnloyP1ent and output. On the other 
hani!, a trade subsidy will raise em!)loyr.nent and mav raise uelfare if the 
consu1:1ption distortion (due to a diver~ence betr-reen n and ,r) does not 
outweigh the enployrnent gain. 
30 
The case of a prohibitive tariff is an 
exception to the proposition that a tariff necessarily reduces uelfare 
when world nrices are given, since (as nill be recalled fron Section B of 
?art II) autarchy may be sunerior to free trade, 
31 
Thus, •:rhen the hoMe 
country has ToonoT)oly pm,er in tra(~e, a zero trade tax is not necessarily 
optir.-1al-· ·in contrast to the standard full-e!"'nloyT"lent case in which, as 
a well-knm-m '!_)ropositnon, free trade is the first-best policy. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1Brecher's [6] discussion includes: a description of the generalmethod, in Chapter III and its mathematical appendix; the efeccts of anincrease in the stock of capital, in Chapter V and its mathematicalappendix; the impact of a technical change in either industry, in ChaptersVI and VII and their mathematical appendices; and the effects of tax-cum­subsidies on production and on factor use, in Chapter IX in the context ofoptimal commercial policy. 
laintroducing factor-intensity reversals would simply complicate theexposition, without adding much insight in the present context. 
2To avoid welfare complications of "voluntary1' unemployment inwhich an individual is out of work because he values an hour of leisuremore than the going uage, it is assumed that the wa3e floor is setinstitutionally--and not set by individual preferences concerning leisureand income. 
3As Johnson [9] has pointed out, a wage that is rigid in money termsbut not in real terms need not lead to unemployment in the standard bartermodel of international trade. 
4A minimum real Hage imposed in only one sector would not lead to("open") unemployment (of the type discussed here) but, as sho~m byJohnson [10], could instead result in inefficient production (at pointsnot on the conventional contract curve). 
5
Recall footnote 2. 
6
The unemployed labour may be thought of as a pool, into which labourflows at any sub-minimum wage, and out of which labour flows (attempting tobid down the market wage) at any above-minimum wage. Seen in this way, thepresent situation is analytically similar to Mundell's ([16], Chapter 6) caseof international factor mobility (when the latter is modified so that labour,not capital, is the internationally mobile factor). In Mundell's case, theminimum (and maximum) home wage is given by the wage available abroad, andthe foreign labour market is a pool to or from which labour flows as the homewage falls below or rises above the foreign wage, respectively. There are,however, two important differences. First, in Mundell 1 s case, the flows oflabour to and from the pool shift the foreign offer curve; uhereas, in thepresent model, labour flows are purely domestic and leave foreign demandunaffected. Second, in Mundell 1 s case, a flow of labour to the pool meansmerely a change in the location of employment; ~-Jhereas, in the present model,a flou of labour to the pool means unemployment. 
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7
Bhagwati [2] discusses variations in the overall employment level 
of capital, not labour. Assuming that he actually has in mind a rigid 
return to capital and a perfectly flexible wage--not the rigid wage and 
perfectly flexible return to capital that he in fact assumes--his results 
and the corresponding present results (reported mainly in Section B of 
Part II) are in basic agreement, making obvious allowance for the fact 
that the rigid factor reward is then different in each case. 
8
According to this price relationship: under incomplete specialization 
there is a one-to-one correspondence, independent of total employment levels, 
between the product-price ratio and (relative and absolute) factor rewards. 
9According to this theorem: under incomplete specialization a 
decrease in total labour employment, at constant relative product prices 
and constant total utilization of capital, will decrease output of the 
labour-intensive good and increase output of the capital-intensive good. 
10
Proof that the Rybczynski line is straight may be found in Mundell 
([16], Chapter 6, page 93, for the analogous case where 1-otal capital is 
varied with total labour constant), and in Brecher ( [ ;:; J, Chapter I, footnote 5) , 
11According to this theorem: under ineomplete specialization a fall 
in the relative price of a commodity louers the reward (in terms of both 
goods) of the factor used intensively in that commodity, anf raises the 
other factor's reward (in terms of both goods). 
12The impossibility of complete specialization in commodity two may 
also be seen geometrically as an immediate consequence of the following 
0proposition (to be proven momentarily): the budget line fo~ any p < p 
(say p") is steeper than the production-possibi.lity frontier at each 
point on OTz, thereby indicating that profits cannot be maximized wheri 
only good two is produced. This proposition is clearly true at T2. There­
fore, it is also true at all other points on OT2 , since (by a well-knovm 
corollary of the Rybczynski Theorem [17] the production-possibility fron­
tier becomes flatter along every ray from the origin (including the vertical 
axis) as total labour employment is decreased (holding total utEizaticn of 
C:lpital cons~t). 
13
Point B must lie to the left of the lower endpoint of the undrawn 
Rybczynski line for p", since at this endpoint (as at all points on this 
line) the profit-maximizing wage is sub-minimal. (Rybczynski lines for 
different values of p cannot intersect, as explained in footnote 15 below, 
so that the undrawn Rybczynski line for p" must lie completely to the right 
of R2F1). Furthermore, point B satisfies the (corner) condition of profit 
maximization, as could be shown easily by reasoning similar to footncte 12. 
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14Also, the economy cannot specialize completely in the first commodity 
at the point on OT1 where labour's wage (and marginal product) equals the 
minimum, since the (corner) condition of profit maximization cannot be met 
at this point as could be shown easily by reasoning similar to footnote 12. 
15Rybczynski lines for different prod1Jct-price ratios cannot intersect 
(as implied by Figure 1), since any point of intersection would have to lie 
on two intersecting production-possibility frontiers--a contradiction, 
because varying total labour employment (with total utilization of capital
held constant) yields only non-intersecting production-possibility frontiers. 
16For an independent discussion of the transformation curve (with the 
minimum wage specified in terms of one good), in a somewhat different 
context, see Lefeber [12]. 
17There are other ways of deleting a full-employment segment like TzR~ 
from the transfor:nation curve. For example, this deletion would be 
achieved (while holding the minimum wage constant at the Rz level) if the 
labour endowment were increased sufficiently, so that the new full­
employment production-possibility frontier (not shown) lay entirely above 
R2R1 extended to the vertical axis. The deletion could also be achieved 
by a sufficient decrease in the stock of capital. In general, the full­
employment (conventional) production-possibility frontier lies entirely
above the Rybczynski line for the minimum wage if and only if industry
two's labour/capital employment ratio along this Rybczynski line is less 
than the given labour/capital endowment ratio. 
ere ore, · · T "t . t· y 
18Th f ignoring· point 1, tish" si uation. is ana1y ica11 
equivalent to Bhagwati's [2] case in which the actual (not the minimum) 
wage is fixed in tenns of one good. 
19The minimum wage could be respecified in terms of good one (instead
of good two), say (for diagrammatic convenience only) at the level defined 
by the first industry's marginal product of labour along R2R1. In this 
case, the transformation curve would oe TzR2R1: RzR1 for p = p'; TzRz for 
all p > p', with employment and output increasing asp rises; and R1for all p < p' • 
Alternatively, the minimum wage could be respecified in terms of a 
constant-utility combination of both goods, as defined by an institutionally
chosen indifference curve. In this case, there would be exactly one p and 
associated Rybczynsld line, say (for diagrami.'1atic convenience only) p' and 
RzR1, whose corresponding profit-maximizing wage just satisfied the 
minimum-utility constraint--i. e., given p' and the correspo.nding profit­
maximizing wage, the labourer's budget line would be tangent to the minimum 
indifference curve. Then, the transformation curve would be T2R2R1T1 , combining 
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the features of the other two m1.m.mum-wage specifications. Each point on 
R2T2 (R1T1 excluding poiat R1) would in general correspond to a higher
(lower) p than if the minimum wage were specified in terms of good one (two)-­
although this price difference might disappear if the minimum indifference 
curve were a straight line. 
To take account of these changes in the transformation curve that 
would result from respecifying the minimum wage in terms of good one or 
a constant-utuility combination of both goods, the following analysis could 
easily be modified (as shown by Brecher [6]). 
20
rnferiority can lead to problems of multiple equilibria and instability
in only the following two cases: sufficiently strong inferiority of the 
capital-intensive first commodity under incomplete specialization in 
production, leadins to multiple equilibria and instability for the level 
of home employment, but not for world offers; and sufficiently strong in­
feriority of the home importable under complete specialization in production,
leading to multiple equilibria and instability in world commodity markets 
and in the home labour market. Some further comments on this point may be 
found in Brecher ([6], footnote 14 of Chapter I, and footnote 19 of Chapter II). 
21Multiple intersections would not result from inferiority of commodity 
two. 
22Bhagwati [2]~ Haberler [8] and Johnson [9] have also demonstrated 
ambiguity in the comparison of free trade with autarchy--for the case 
where world prices are given, so that (assuming the free-trade and home 
autarchic price ratios are not equal) free trade leads to complete speciali­
zation (when there is no domestic immobility of factors). 
23For any trade tax (subsidy) of rate t > 0 (O > t > -1), all possible
consumption equilibria on rzri lie above (below) point r 1 (r2), since the world-price budget line through point R1 (Rz) is steeper undeT a trade tax (subsidy) than under free trade. 
24u the tariff were imposed only on imports of good one (two), or only 
on exports of good two (one), then the tariff-inclusive offer curve would be 
t t t t
U2AzOA1U1 (UzAzOAlUl). 
25
In the standard full-employment literature, the Metzler Paradox [15] is 
the case in which raising a tariff lowers or leaves constant the domestic 
relative price of the home importable, so that (under incomplete specialization)
the tariff's protective effect is perverse (in the sense that output of the 
home importable decreases or is constant respectively). A general statement 
of the Metzler Condition, satisfaction of which ensures the Metzler Paradox 
(assuming stability in world commodity markets), may be found (for the case 
of "small" tariff changes) in Kemp ([11], condition (4.4), page 96). It 
suffices here to say that, for the Metzler Condition to hold (and hence for 
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the rretzler 1"aradox to occur in the standard full-ernploy:nent case), an
inelastic forei!"n offer curve is necessary (a.ssuminp no inferiority in
home consumption) but is not sufficient. 
26T::xceptions to this proposition in the standard full-emr,loyment model
are ruled out by the present assumption that neither ~ood is inferior. For
these exceptions when the home exportable is inferior,, see T~eI!lp ( [11], pages
306-310). 
27The prohibitive nature of a hoce tariff in the present oinimum-wage model
is analytically siP1ilar to a tariff's prohibitive effect in rtundell Is ((16),
Chapter 6) model of international factor mobility. In '.Jundell's case,
equilibrium requires that the domestic product•··price ratio be the same in both
countries (in order to equalize factor rewards internationally)--impossible
under tariff-restricted trade. In the present minimum-wage case,, equilibrium
requires only that p = p' in the home country (so that the profit-maximizing
wage equals the mininu~ and labour ceases to flow to or from the pool of
unemployed)--impossible under tariff-restricted trade if the foreipn offer
curve is infinitely elastic at n' = p', but possible if the foreign offer
curve is less than infinitely elastic. 
28rf the assumption of. footnote 24 were Made, a tariff could reverse the
direction of trade instead of leadinz to autarchy; althoueh the following
employment and uelfare conclusions ,:;rould still hold. 
29Things are nou slip:htly more complicated, ·since the value of p correspondingto a given level of r-relfare increases as the tariff is raised, as could
easily be verified. 
30A ereat enouP;h trade subsidy will achieve full-emr,loyment production
at point T1 in Figure 6. Incidentally 1 T1 can also be reached by a pro­duction tax-cum-subsidy in .favour of__ good one and 1 since no consumptiondistortion occurs, this policy is superior to the trade subsidy that also
leads to T1 • Furthermore (as shm-m by Erecher [6] ~ Chapter IX), the pro­
duction tax-cum-subsidy may even be a first-best policy. 
31Bhap:r-1ati's [2] demonstration that a tariff may improve welfare is an
example of the case of a tariff which leads to autarchy. A tax-cum-subsidy
in production that also lead$ to autarchy is no better than a prohibitive
tariff, since the usual added consumption distortion of a tariff does not
apply in autarchy. 
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